As a reader and as how I understand the article, I positively accept the idea of the proponent based on the necessity, beneficiality and practicability of his work. This is to clarify why I affirm the idea of the proponent and be enlightened with the ultimate goal of the author’s idea as well as to answer why this article becomes the center of criticism to the learners as if whether they accept or reject the idea.
Now, the concerned of Gottlob Frege’s On Sense and Reference or in German, it is Über Sinn und Bedeutung which was written in 1892 shows the necessity to focus on the dilemma or to the question of how the sense (or mode of presentation) of a sign is related to the meaning which is expressed by the sign. In fact, Frege examines the question of how the object which is designated by a sign is related to the meaning which is expressed by the sign. He explains that changes in the sense (or mode of presentation) of a sign may change the meaning of the sign, and he describes how changes in the sense of a sign may also change the sense of the expression in which the sign is contained. Thus, he discusses the relation between sense and reference, and he examines the relation between signification and meaning so that the readers can easily understand his point of advocating or insinuating the idea to the field of philosophy.
To further understand the article, let us be reminded the beneficiality of how Frege defines a sign as any name, word, combination of words, or expression which may be used to designate an object. It is very clear that the sense of a sign is the part of its meaning which depends on its mode of presentation. Of course, the meaning of a sign is to be distinguished from the object to which the sign refers and with that the object to which a sign refers may provide the basis for the sign's dimension of reference. However, the meaning of a sign may have both a dimension of sense and a dimension of reference.
In a complex manner, Frege explains that the mode of presentation of a sign and the mode of reference of the sign to an object may correspond to each other, but the sense of a sign may change without changing the identity of the object to which the sign refers. The identity of the object to which a sign refers may be independent of the way in which the sign is presented. Logically, Frege also explains that an object may be designated by many different signs, and that different signs which designate the same object may have different meanings. Every sign which refers to an object may not necessarily have a sense or meaning. Every sign which has a sense or meaning may not necessarily refer to a definite object. The object which is designated by a sign may not necessarily be capable of being defined.
As an example of how different signs for the same object may have different senses, Frege notes that the term 'morning star' and the term 'evening star' both refer to the same object, although these terms have different senses. The term 'morning star' refers to the planet Venus as it appears at dawn, while the term 'evening star' refers to the planet Venus as it appears at dusk.
Furthermore, Frege argues that the designation of any object by a particular sign may be arbitrary, and that any name or expression may be arbitrarily chosen to designate a particular object. Signs are themselves objects, and thus may themselves be designated by other signs, likewise the connection between a sign and the object which it designates may not necessarily be explained by any quality of the object. According to Frege, the discovery of different signs may be used to designate the same object may in some cases enable us to attain additional knowledge of the object which is designated by those signs. To discover all of the possible signs which may be used to designate an object may be to attain all possible knowledge of that object, but such comprehensive knowledge of an object may not be within our capacity to attain.
Frege explains that the object to which a sentence refers is either that which is true or that which is false. The object to which a sentence refers is thus its truth-value, i.e. the set of conditions which determine its truth or falsehood. Every declarative sentence is either a sign for that which is true or a sign for that which is false. Declarative sentences are signs for truth-values and may designate these truth-values in many different ways. In connection with, Frege also explains that the thought which is expressed by any declarative sentence has the same relation to truth and falsehood as sense has to reference. The truth-value of a sentence is not determined by the mode of presentation of the sentence (or by the sentence's dimension of sense), but is defined by the snetence's dimension of reference. Thus, in order to determine whether the thought which is expressed by a sentence provides us with any valid knowledge, we must be able to determine not only the meaning of the sentence but its truth-value.
According to Frege, an expression within a sentence may be changed without changing the truth-value of the sentence if the expression is replaced by another expression which has the same truth-value or which designates the same object. However, an exception to this general rule may occur when a subordinate clause of a complex sentence does not have a truth-value and is replaced by another subordinate clause which does not have a truth-value. The truth-value of the whole sentence may be changed even though no change has occurred in the truth-value of each subordinate clause.
Frege explains that in some cases a subordinate clause in a complex sentence may refer to a thought which is expressed by the main clause of the sentence. The subordinate clause may thus not have a truth-value of its own, and may refer only indirectly to the set of conditions for truth and falsehood which determine the truth-value of the whole sentence. The subordinate clause may not express a complete thought, and may therefore not have any definite meaning apart from the way in which it contributes to the meaning of the whole sentence.
Frege also explains that in a logically perfect language, every proper name or sign designates an object. In a logically imperfect language, every proper name or sign does not designate an object. Logical errors in langauage may be caused by using ambiguous signs or by using signs which do not refer to definite objects. Logical errors may be avoided by not using signs which do not refer to definite objects.
If you are going to anlyze the article “On Sense and Reference,” Frege sets out to ascertain if there is "a relation between objects, or between names or signs of objects." He explains that there is a problem in the fact that, if there are two words used for an object, then a=b will mean the same thing as a=a, even though one is an analytic statement and one is a synthetic statement. Frege advocates differentiating two different kinds of meaning for some terms. A word's reference is the specific object to which it refers, so that the reference for "desk" would be a desk. A word's sense is the way that a word refers to a particular object. Frege also demarcates the criteria of "sign" or "name" to designate a proper name that refers to a specific member of a class or group of objects.
According to Frege, "the reference and sense of a sign are to be distinguished from the associated idea." In other words, we all may have slightly different ideas of a sense- feelings, thoughts, moods, etc. that go along with our memory of the image or object we have in mind. He also uses the example of viewing the moon in a telescope. Even though the viewers would be looking at precisely the same object, what they actually saw would differ slightly depending upon the quality of the viewer's vision, the exact moment that she or he looked into the telescope, and other minute variables that can all add up to a qualitatively different experience. He points out that some readers may have an objection to this argument because we cannot be sure that the object referred to as the moon has any actual reference. He explains that when we refer to the moon, it is not our intention to refer to our idea of or feelings associated with the moon. Instead, we "presuppose a reference."
He then goes on to address the sense and reference of common names, using the example of the morning and the evening star. For a person who does not know that the morning and the evening star are the same star, the sense of the word will be different. The problem that arises with this is whether or not the word can even have a reference, since the person using the sentence and referring to the object is ignorant as to the actual nature of the object. He settles on the answer that the reference of a sentence is sought when we are inquiring after its truth value. So, for example, the person who did not know that the morning and the evening star were the same would be inquiring after the reference of their sentence if they were to do research on the morning and evening star. They would stumble across the reference once they learned that the morning and evening star were the same.
The most important concept to grasp from Frege's Theory of Sense is that a name's meaning is imprecise unless it is analyzed in terms of sense and reference. "Reference" is the exact object indicated by a name, and "sense" is the meaning of a name or noun independent of its reference. Frege called sense "Sinn," but other scholars have used "meaning," "intention" or "content" to explain it; for "Bedeutung" or "reference," scholars have used "denotation," "nominatum" and "designatum."
We must be guided that it is just a theory of the philosophy of language and philosophy of the mind. Essentially, the theory of sense posits that "sense" and "reference" are two different and separate aspects of a term's meaning, and that both of these are semantic necessities for a statement to have significance.